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certification hearing. After a hearing, ERAC affirmed the OEPA issuance
of the section 401 certification.
Friends raised two issues on appeal from that order. Friends first
argued that OEPA issued the section 401 certification in error because
Toledo submitted an incomplete application. The court noted that the COE
must have felt the application was complete before it issued the public
notice. Further, the court concluded that submitting an incomplete section
401 permit application does not invalidate OEPA's issuance of the Section
401 certification. Friends further claimed that Toledo's application failed
to provide the required additional documentation to support its section 401
certification. Specifically, Friends contended that Toledo's section 401
application did not provide the intended fill material's chemical
composition. Friends argued that Ohio law required identification of
regulated pollutants that applicant would discharge. But the applicable
code section did not require the applicant to identify the chemical
constituents of the fill material, only the "substance" and "amount."
Further, the state administrative code addressed the potential for the
presence of "regulated pollutants" in other sections. Therefore, the court
concluded that Toledo had satisfied the applicable requirements for the
section 401 application.
Friends next claimed that Toledo must resubmit its section 401
certification due to alterations in the planned use for the 5.34 acres adjacent
to the Ottawa River. In the initial plans, a shipping lot completely covered
the 5.34 acres at issue. In the ERAC appeal, Toledo had modified the
plans by moving the access road to the northern rather than the southern
edge of the shipping lot. The court found that this "minor" change did not
cause any additional wetlands loss, and was therefore immaterial. The
court, therefore, affirmed OEPA's issuance of the Section 401
certification.
Shana Smilovits

OREGON
Norden v. Oregon, 329 Or. 641 (Or. 2000) (holding that under Oregon's
Administrative Procedure Act the scope of the record on judicial review of
an order in an other than contested water proceeding was not limited to the
information the water department had before it when it issued its order).
In November 1994, the Water Resources Department ("Department")
issued an order informing Dorothy Norden ("Norden") that she was not
entitled to divert water from a spring arising on her property without first
obtaining a water right permit. In Oregon, a property owner was required
to obtain a water right permit if waters leaving a spring on the property
form a watercourse and, if undiverted, would flow onto the land of
another.
The circuit court considered evidence as to what information was
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before both Norden and the Department before and after the time the order
was issued. That court found in favor of Norden. It set aside the
Department's order, concluding that there was not substantiai evidence
from which a reasonable person could conclude that the water arising from
the spring on Norden's property would flow off her property and into a
nearby creek if she did not divert it. Thus, she had the right to use the
water without first obtaining a water right permit.
The issue before the appeals court was whether the record on judicial
review in an other than contested water proceeding was confined to the
information gathered at the time the order was issued or whether it
included information gathered both before and after that time. The
Department argued the latter; Norden the former. Under O.R.S. section
183.482, the court reviewed for legal error, abuse of agency discretion,
and lack of substantial evidence in the record. It found that the scope of
the record that the circuit court had developed under O.R.S. section
183.484 was correct, but that the court had erred in setting aside the
Department's order on the ground that it was not supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
Appealing to the supreme court, two questions were presented: (1)
whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the record in an other
than contested case hearing was not limited to the information that the
agency had before it when it issued its order; and (2) whether substantial
evidence existed from which a reasonable person could have concluded that
the water arising from Norden's property would run off her property if not
diverted. This court affirmed the appellate decision on both issues.
The supreme court's task was to determine the legislature's intent. To
do so, it examined the text and context of section 183.484, giving words of
common usage their plain and ordinary and, if applicable, legal meaning.
The court found nothing in Oregon's Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") directing an agency in an other than contested case proceeding to
make a record or to make findings of fact before issuing its order. Due to
the absence of this requirement, the first opportunity that a party might
have had to present evidence would be when it was before the circuit court.
Therefore, the court concluded that reference to the "record" and "findings
of fact" in section 183.484 was to the record that was made before the
circuit court and to the findings that the circuit made based on the evidence
in that record when it reversed the agency.
Section 183.484(4) mandated judicial review for substantial evidence of
the whole record. Under state case law, the court had previously held that
whole record review meant consideration of whatever evidence the record
contained that would detract from, as well as support, the agency's order.
The effect of limiting the scope of the record to the evidence that was
available to the agency at the time it issued its order would thus undermine
the whole record review as required by section 183.484(4). The court
therefore found that the text of the statute suggested that the legislature's
intent was not to limit the scope of review only to the evidence that the
agency had before it when it issued its order.
The supreme court also looked to the procedural statutes on contested
cases for guidance. Those statutes revealed that in a contested case the
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legislature imposed on agencies the requirement of trial-like proceedings,
culminating in a record, findings of fact, and conclusions of law that must
have accompanied the agency's final order. Further, judicial review for
substantial evidence of the whole record was required. The court found no
suggestion in the Act that the legislature intended the record in an other
than contested case proceeding to be less complete or more developed than
the record in a contested case proceeding. The court concluded that the
parties in an other than contested case proceeding are afforded the same
opportunity to develop a record as those parties in a contested case
proceeding.
On the second issue of substantial evidence, both sides presented
documentary and testimonial evidence.
The supreme court found,
however, that the record, when viewed as a whole, would permit a
reasonable person to conclude that the water arising from the spring on
Norden's property would run off her property if not diverted.
Accordingly, Norden was required to obtain a water right permit.
Elizabeth Appleton
Plotkin v. Washington County, 165 Or. App. 246 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing Land Use Board of Appeals' decision to disallow county's
approval of a subdivision in a designated wildlife habitat because the
habitat was neither identified as protected in the county's community plan
nor was it adjacent to an area of significant natural resources identified
under the plan).
A Washington County, Oregon hearings officer approved a twelve-lot
residential subdivision on a parcel of land designated as a "wildlife
habitat." The Plotkins and Wilsons (collectively the "Plotkins") appealed
the county's decision to the Land Use Board of Appeals ("LUBA"), which
held that as a riparian zone, the area in question was protected from
development under the county's Community Development Code ("CDC").
The CDC regulated development in areas that possessed "significant
natural resources." Section 422-2 stated that areas subject to the terms of
the CDC are "[t]hose areas identified in the applicable Community Plan or
the Rural/Natural Resource Plan Element as Significant Natural
Resources." The plot of land in dispute was not identified under the
county's plan. On the Plotkins' appeal, however, LUBA found that as a
riparian zone, the identification requirement of section 422-2 did not apply
to the habitat, but rather that section 422-3.3A governed the area
independent of the primary provision. Section 422-3.3A stated that "[n]o
new or expanded alteration of the vegetation or terrain of the Riparian
Zone ... or significant water area or wetland [as identified in the
applicable Community Plan or the Rural/Natural Resource Plan Element]
shall be allowed subject to exceptions."
According to the LUBA
interpretation, this provision prohibited development in the riparian zone as
contemplated by the county regardless of the area not being identified

